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COMMENTS
INFANTS - NEGLIGENCE - IMPUTING PARENT'S
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO A CHILD
NON SUI JURIS
The doctrine of imputing the parents'1 contributory negligence to a
child non sui juris to bar reco.ery in an action brought by the child 2 for
injuries sustained, is receding farther back into the dusty pages of time.
Notwithstanding its almost total repudiation,3 four states have dog-
matically perpetuated its memory: Delaware, Maine, Maryland and
Massachusetts.
In a 1951 Maryland decision,3a the plaintiff child was injured in an
alley adjoining his home by the defendant's truck, driven by one of its
agents. The mother knew that the child was playing in the alley and
that trucks. were being driven through it. The question of the mother's
contributory negligence in allowing her three year old child to play un-
attended was properly held to be submitted to the jury to deny the child's
recovery. "If the child be so young as not to be able to take care of
itself, then parental neglect resulting in injury may be imputed to the
child." 4
Thus, the Maryland court remains as the chief proponent of a doc-
trine that had the "dubious distinction of originating wholly in dictum" 5
in the case of Hartfield v. Roper.4 An implied agency was found to exist
so that the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se, directly applied.
However, this fictitious use of the law of agency was just a remnant of
the old Roman law doctrine of "identification," introduced in England
by the case of Thorogood v. Bryan7 and brought to bear on children non
sui juris through the decision rendered in Waite v. N. E. Ry. Co.s The
English court there held that the negligence of the grandmother in
charge of the plaintiff child at the time of injury would preclude the
'The doctrine applies with equal vigor to custodians, but only 'parents' will
be referred to in the comment.
2 The comment is confined only to actions brought by the child in his own
name or on his behalf.3 Note, 15 A.L.R. 414 (1921; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 488; PROSSER ON TORTS,
419, 420 (1941) ; 65 C.J.S. 801; 38 Am. Jur. 926.
Sa Graham v. Western Maryland Dairy, Inc., 81 A. 2d 457 (Md., 1951).
"York Ice Machinery Corp. v. Sachs, 167 Md. 123, 124, 173 A. 240, 245 (1934);
Graham v. Western Maryland Dairy Inc., et al., supra, note 3a, at 459.
5 Imputation of Parents or Custodians Contributory Negligence to an Infant
Plaintiff, STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVIsIoN CoMMissioN (1935).
SVrend. (N.Y.) 615, 34 Am. Dec. 273 (1839).
-8 C.B. 115, 18 L.S.C.P. 336 (1849); overruled in Mills v. Armstrong (the
Bernina), 13 App. Cas. 1, 58 L.S. 423 (House of Lords, 1888).8 E.B. & E. 728, 28 L.S.Q.B. 258 (1858); overruled in Oliver v. Birmingham
and Midland Motor Co., 48 J.L.R. 540, 1 K.B. 35 (1933). For an able discus-
sion on Imputed Negligence with emphasis on Parent and Child see Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 161, 170 (1935).
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child from recovering against a third person. The court's theory was
founded on the principle that the child was "identified" with his cus-
todian, and the negligence of the latter is then the negligence of the
form .r.9
I. ELEMENTS OF TRE DOCTRINE
The doctrine itself has two component elements that are necessary
before it will be invoked. The one is that the child must be found to be
non sui juris arid the other, that the parent must be contributorily negli-
gent. The general rule, of universal acceptance, holds a child non sui
juris to be one so young as to be incapable of taking care of itself or
a child not held to any degree of care.10 The precise age at which a
child is non sui juris is the subject of a great diversity of opinion, both
as to whether a court should set an age as a matter of law, and whether
that presumption is conclusive or rebuttable." A leading Wisconsin case
held:
"It is our considerate judgment that the better and more just rule
is that which permits a child of the age of about 6 years to be
found guilty of contributory negligence'if from the facts and
circumstances it is apparent from his age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience he knows or ought to have known of
the dangers involved in a certain act and in the exercise of such
ordinary care as he should have exercised he could have avoided
the injury.12
The question of parental negligence presents another broad field of
divergence, because it does not lend itself to the formulation of any
substantive rule of law. Each case, of necessity, rests on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances 13 so that in most cases it is a proper
jury question. Wisconsin is in accord with the general test or standard
of conduct necessary, viz., whether the conduct of the parent measured
up to the care that an ordinary careful prudent parent exercises under
the same or similar circumstances.' 4 The particular negligence of which
9 Cf. Gallagher v. Johnson, 237 Mass. 455, 130 N.E. 174 (1921). "Being in the
actual physical custody of his father, the child was identified with him so far
as concerns due care and negligence."
10 Jacobs v. H. J. Koehler Sporting Goods Co., 208 N.Y. 416, 102 N.E. 519
(1913). "An infant may be of such tender years as to be incapable of personal
negligence. At such age the infant is termed non sui juris ...
" Note, 174 A.L.R. 1080 (1948).
22 De Groot v. Van Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 118, 273 N.W. 725 (1937).
13 Schmidt v. The Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 23 Wis. 186, 188(1868). Cf. De Nardi v. Palanca, 120 Cal. App. 371, 8 P. 2d 220 (1932). "I
instruct you that the amount of care to be exercised by a parent for the
safety of a child is dependent upon the age and sex of the child, and upon
the question whether dangers exist in the vicinity where the child is accus-
tomed to play, and that such parent should exercise such a degree of care
for the safety of his child as may be reasonably necessary to save from
such danger. If he fails to exercise such care he is guilty of negligence."
Cf. Monrean v. Eastern Wis. R. & L. Co., 152 Wis. 618, 624, 140 N.W. 309
(1913).
1Note, 51 A.L.R. 209 (1927).
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the parent stands accused lies in his placing the infant in a position of
possible danger with which the child will be unable to cope.' 5
II. MINORITY RULE
The minority states have perverted the law of agency to substantiate
their position. The underlying basis or assumption of the doctrine is,
that since the child is incapable of caring for itself and is held to no
degree of care, the parent who has the care or custody of the child is
deemed the child's keeper or agent. Therefore the act of negligence of
the parent is the act of the child and the principle that the acts of an
agent are the acts of the principal is applied. The Massachusetts court
typified this reasoning when it sanctioned a charge to the jury:
".. . the boy has no independent standing from his father so far
as the matter of liability is concerned. In other words his case
must stand or fall with his father's, because the relationship
between them is that of father and son. The boy was not old
enough nor was he in the condition to exercise any independent
due care on his own part, and so he is to have the benefit of the
due care of his father in so far as his father exercised due care;
and he is also charged with the negligence of the father in case
the father is negligent. And so the case stands or falls upon the
due care or negligence of the father."' 6
The Wisconsin court championed the agency theory in Prideaux v. City
of Mineral Point,17 but this fallacious application of the law of agency
was laid to rest when a later court decided that a third party could not
hold the occupant of a vehicle as principal of the negligent driver.'8
It is interesting to note, however, that Wisconsin had previously held the
Prideaux case, involving the imputation of a husband driver's negligence
to his wife, a passenger, as one of agency, inapplicable in a decision in
which it would not impute a mother's contributory negligence to her
infant child.'"
III. MAJORITY RULE
Where the Wisconsin decision quietly repudiated the doctrine, it was
not so in other jurisdictions where it underwent scathing criticism on
35 Supra, note 5, at p. 69.
16 Supra, note 9, at p. 174.
1743 Wis. 513, 528 (1878) ; cf. Kuchler v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 157 Wis.
107, 146 N.W. 1133 (1914). Corrigan, Walter D., Imputed Negligence As
Applied Against A Guest In a Private Conveyance (A criticism of the Wis-
consin Rule), 3 MARQ. L. REv. 169 (1918).
IsReiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739, 18 A.L.R. 362 (1921). An
excellent study treating the Reiter case by Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1
Wis. L. REv. 193 (1921).
29 Gulessarian v. Madison Railway Company, 172 Wis. 400, 406, 179 N.W. 573,
15 A.L.R. 406 (1920). "It is considered that the doctrine approved in the fore-
going citations and authors holding that the contributory negligence of the
parent or custodian of the child will not preclude recovery by the child for
negligent injury, is a just rule and should be adopted in the jurisprudence
of this state." Noted, Boardman, Parents' Negligence Not Imputed to Infant,
1 Wis. L. REv. 191 (1921).
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logical, legal and social grounds."0 In a most forecful opinion, the
Minnesota court, in a decision cited extensively for its legal import, laid
the foundation on which the majority decisions stand.
"The right of an infant to damages for injuries to his person
caused by the wrongful act of others is a property right, and
entitled to the same protection in the courts as is accorded other
property held or owned by him. He is entitled to the protection
of the law equally with persons who have attained their majority
and to refuse them relief on the ground of lis parent's indiffer-
ence or negligence would be to deny it to him. To impute to him
negligence of others is harsh in the extreme, whether the negli-
gence so imputed be that of his parents, their servants, or his
guardian. He is a citizen within the meaning of the law of the
land, and entitled to such rights and privileges as are appropriate
to his class, and to the equal protection of law."21
IV. MINORITY RULE CRITICIZED
The author would like to bring attention to several more basic
errors and inconsistencies in the doctrine itself. They also form the
hard core of legal and social opposition to the minority rule. The first
of these concerns the minority position as to the ultimate disposition
of the funds recovered by the child.
The minority take the stand that the negligent parent through his
control over the child in effect would profit by his own wrong if his
negligence were not imputable. This is the underlying policy in denying
a negligent parent relief under the survival and death statutes. It can
be stated in rebutal that to deny relief on the ground that the money in
reality goes to the negligent parents is to overlook the fact that such
disposition of funds as recovered by the child can be governed by the
court and expended for the child's benefit.
22
A further basic inconsistency in the minority doctrine, lies in its
apparent conflict with the general rules governing imputed negligence
on the whole. As a rule the negligence of another will not be imputed
to one without personal fault, ". . . if he neither authorized such conduct
nor participated therein nor had control of the conduct of such other."23
That a child of tender years is incapable of controlling the conduct of
his custodian who is alleged to be contributorily negligent, is of such
common understanding that it need not be labored upon. Nor are parent
20 Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co. et aL., 180 Cal. 32, 171 P. 2d 203, 204, 15 A.L.R.
401 (1919); cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 18 Okla. 75, 89 P.
207, 209, 11 Ann. Cas. 681 (1907). Overruled on appeal, but not affecting
Oklahoma's majority stand. 213 U.S. 1, 29 S.Ct. 321, 53 L.Ed. 671 (1909).
21 Mattson v. Minn. & N.W.R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 107 N.W. 443, 70 L.R.A. 503
(1905).
22 Negligence of Custodian as Imputed to a Child, 47 HARV. L. REv. 874 (1934).
For a more thorough treatment of death and survival statutes, Gilmore,
Imputed Negligence (Concluded), 1 Wis. L. Rzv. 257 (1921).
2365 C.J.S. 797; 38 Am. Jur. 445.
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and child in such privity as to be engaged in a joint enterprise merely
because they bear to each other that relationship.24
Furthermore, the doctrine as propounded by the minority courts
presents the anomolous situation of imputing negligence to a child of
tender years who is incapable by common definition, of personal negli-
gence in the first instance.25
V. MINORITY RULE MODIFIED
Some courts following the minority view have attempted to modify
it. The courts of Delaware set forth two situations where negligence of
the parent may or may not be imputed to the child. Where the parent is
merely negligent in leaving a child of tender years unattended, and the
child is confronted by a dangerous situation, the court will not invoke
the rule. However, in a case where the parent is actively negligent, as
in driving an automobile with the child as the only passenger, because
the parent's actual conduct produced the dangerous situation, the court
will then impute the negligence of the parent to the child.20
The New York courts have also secured changes in the rule and
though the State has repudiated the doctrine, 27 their modifications28 are
of historical interest. They held the negligence of a parent or guardian
when acting in a custodial capacity distinguishable from active creation
by that parent of a situation whereby the child might be exposed to an
injury from a third party. Negligence was imputed in the first instance,
but not in the latter situation.
29
The most pronounced and significant modification took place in the
states of Massachusetts and New York where the courts would not
apply the doctrine if the child's conduct at the time of the accident
measured up to that of an adult. By way of further clarification the
New York court stated the rule in this manner:
"If a child, though non sui juris, has not committed or omitted
an act which would constitute contributory negligence in a person
of years of discretion, an injury by the negligence of another
24 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Calvert, 170 Ala. 565, 54 So. 184 (1910); cf. Klas v.
Fenske, 248 Wis. 534, 22 N.W. 2d 596 (1945) ; Reiter v. Grober, supra, note
18.
25 Supra, note 10.
26 Messick v. Delaware Electric Power Co., 36 Del. (6 N.W. Harr.) 354, 175 A.
772 (1934) ; noted Loeb, Edna, Imputtaion of Parent's Contributory Negligence
to Child, 4 DuK.E B.A.J. 95 (1935).
27 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 73. Negligence of Parent or other Custodian not
imputed to infant. In an action brought by an infant to recover damages for
personal injury the contributory negligence of the infant's parent or other
custodian shall not be imputed to the infant.
2 Hennessey v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 6 App. Div. 206, 39 N.Y.S. 805 (1896);
Spaulding v. Mineab, 239 App. Div. 460, 268 N.Y.S. 772 (1933). Contra:
Caroline County Com'rs. v. Beaulah, 153 Md. 221, 183 A. 25 (1927).
29 "Under the logic of these authorities Mrs. Spaudling's negligence in her
connection with the operation of the car would not be imputable to the infant
while the improper exposure of the child to danger would amount to negli-




cannot be defended upon the alleged negligence of the parent."30
The modification certainly brought sorely needed relief, but to a rule
already frought with legal confusion, it also imposed a standard of care
on children of tender years that the courts required of adults. May it
be noted in mitigation of this position, however, despite the fact that the
courts had further clouded the doctrine with uncertainty, it was the only
standard of care capable of application in view of the principle that a
child non sui juris is not held to any standard of care. The child being
deemed incapable of caring for itself, the cou-rt was faced with the
dilemma of applying the rules setting forth the standard of conduct
required of children sui juris or the standard of care required of adults.
It can readily be perceived that application of the first standard to in-
fants non sui juris would be difficult and illogical. However, in view of
the fact that an infant's conduct is usually negative in these cases, in-
action, ratther than any affirmative cause on his part, being the prime
factor producing the dangerous situation, application of the adult
standard is more just and equitable.
VI. NEW YORK STATUTE
Though the doctrine was discredited by the overwhelming majority
of the courts, both in this country and in England, the New York courts
would not rise up to the occasion and abrogate the rule.31 The problem
was brought to the forefront by the New York Revision Commission,
32
and by legislative fiat33 its courts were unshackled from the doctrine
they lethargically promulgated for a span of 96 years. It is interesting
to note that once again on firm legal footing, New York in an early case
refused to permit an inquiry into the infant's standard of conduct and
maintained the principle that a child non sui juris is not held to any
standard of care.3 4
VII. CONCLUSION
The minority states should follow the example set by the New York
legislature and repudiate the doctrine by statute. The rule denies infant
children a cause of action, a valuable property right, and its continuation
works a hardship that finds no sanction on legal or moral grounds in the
annals of American jurisprudence. EDWARD A. DUDEK
SOMcGarry v. Loomis, 63 N.Y. 104, 107, 20 Am. Rep. 510 (1875); accord:
Kupchinsky v. Vacuum Oil Co. et al., 263 N.Y. 128, 188 N.E. 278 (1933);
Ihl v. Forty-Second Street R.R. Co., 47 N.Y. 317 (1872); Friedman v.
Berthiaume, 303 Mass. 159, 21 N.E. 2d 261, 264 (1939); Cadmon v. White,
296 Mass. 117, 5 N.E. 2d 19, 20 (1936).
31 The Minneosta court did not wait for legislative action, supra, note 21, at 448.
"Though the Fitzgerald case has remained undisturbed many years as the
law of the state, the rule there laid down is not a rule of property, no rights
will be affected by a departure from it, for no one has a vested right to
negligently cause injury to another. . . ." But Wisconsin held: "were it a
rule of property we should certainly apply to it the rule of stare decisis.
But it is not a rule of property." Supra, note 18, at 496.
32 Supra, note 5.
33 Supra, note 27.
34 Meyer v. Inguaggiato et al., 258 App. Div. 331, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (1940).
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